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Abstract
We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous function
and a Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game in which only one
player is different from other players, and the game is symmetric for the other players.
Then,
1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric for players other than one
player, implies Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of this player and one of other
players with symmetry for the other players.
2. Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of one player and one of other players with sym-
metry for the other players implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is
symmetric for the other players.
Thus, they are equivalent.
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1 Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous function and a
Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game in which only one player is
different from other players, and the game is symmetric for the other players. We will show
the following results.
1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric for players other than one
player, implies Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of this player and one of other players
with symmetry for the other players.
2. Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of one player and one of other players with symmetry
for the other players implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric for
the other players.
Thus, they are equivalent. Symmetry for the other players means that those players (players
other than one player) have the same payoff function and strategy space, and so their equilib-
rium strategies, maximin strategies and minimax strategies are the same.
An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly.
Suppose that there are four firms, A, B, C and D in an oligopolistic industry. Let p¯iA, p¯iB, p¯iC
and p¯iD be the absolute profits of the firms. Then, their relative profits are
piA = p¯iA−
1
3
(p¯iB+ p¯iC+ p¯iD), piB = p¯iB−
1
3
(p¯iA+ p¯iC+ p¯iD),
piC = p¯iC−
1
3
(p¯iA+ p¯iB+ p¯iD), piD = p¯iD−
1
3
(p¯iA+ p¯iB+ p¯iC).
We see
piA+piB+piC+piD = p¯iA+ p¯iB+ p¯iC+piD− (p¯iA+ p¯iB+ p¯iC+piC) = 0.
Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-sum game1. If
the oligopoly is fully asymmetric because the demand function is not symmetric (in a case of
differentiated goods) or firms have different cost functions (in both homogeneous and differ-
entiated goods cases), maximin strategies and minimax strategies of firms do not correspond
to Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if the oligopoly is symmetric for three firms in the
sense that the demand function is symmetric and those firms have the same cost function, the
maximin strategies of those firms with the corresponding minimax strategy of one firm (for
the other players) constitute a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric for the three firms. In
Appendix we present an example of a four-firms relative profit maximizing oligopoly. We see
from this example that with two aliens the equivalence result does not hold.
1About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato
(2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a),
Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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2 The model and Sion’s minimax theorem
Consider a multi-players zero-sum game with only one alien. There are n players i= 1, . . . ,n,
n≥ 3. The strategic variables for the players are s1, s2, . . . , sn, and (s1,s2, . . . ,sn) ∈ S1×S2×
·· ·×Sn. S1, S2, . . . , Sn are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces. The payoff
function of each player is ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn), i= 1,2, . . . ,n. We assume
ui’s for i = 1,2, . . . ,n are continuous real-valued functions on S1× S2×·· ·× Sn,
quasi-concave on Si for each s j ∈ S j, j 6= i, and quasi-convex on S j for j 6= i for
each si ∈ Si.
n players are partitioned into two groups. Group 1 and Group n. Group 1 includes n− 1
players, Players 1, 2, . . . , n−1, and Group n includes only Player n. In Group 1 n−1 players
are symmetric in the sense that they have the same payoff function and strategy space. Thus,
their equilibrium strategies, maximin strategies and minimax strategies are the same. Only
Player n has a different payoff function and a strategy space. Its equilibrium strategy may be
different from those for the other players.
Since the game is a zero-sum game, we have
u1(s1,s2, . . . ,sn)+u2(s1,s2, . . . ,sn)+ . . . ,un(s1,s2, . . . ,sn) = 0, (1)
for given (s1,s2, . . . ,sn).
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let f : X×Y → R be a function, that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first
variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
f (x,y) =min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
f (x,y).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Let s j’s for j 6= i,n; i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1} be given. Then, ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn) is a function of
si and sn. We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the following equation.
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn). (2)
Note that we do not require
max
sn∈Sn
min
si∈Si
un(s1,s2, . . . ,sn) =min
si∈Si
max
sn∈Sn
un(s1,s2, . . . ,sn),
nor
max
si∈Si
min
s j∈S j
ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn) = min
s j∈S j
max
si∈Si
ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn), j 6= i; i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}.
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We assume that argmaxsi∈Siminsn∈Sn ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn) and argminsn∈Snmaxsi∈Si ui(s1,s2, . . . ,sn)
are unique, that is, single-valued. By the maximum theorem they are continuous in s j’s, j 6=
i,n. Also, throughout this paper we assume that the maximin strategy and the minimax strat-
egy of players in any situation are unique, and the best responses of players in any situation
are unique.
Let s j = s for all j 6= i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}. Consider the following function.
s→ argmax
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s, . . . ,si, . . . ,s, . . . ,sn).
Since ui is continuous, Si and Sn are compact, and all Si’s are the same, this function is also
continuous with respect to s. Thus, there exists a fixed point. Denote it by s˜. s˜ satisfies
argmax
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = s˜. (3)
From (2) we have
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn). (4)
From symmetry for Players 1, 2, . . . , n−1, s˜ satisfies (3) and (4) for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}.
3 The main results
Consider a Nash equilibrium of an n-players zero-sum game. Let s∗i ’s, i∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1} and
s∗n, be the values of si’s which, respectively, maximize ui’s. Then,
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
n)≥ ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n) for all si ∈ Si, i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1},
un(s
∗
1,s
∗
2, . . . ,s
∗
n−1,s
∗
n)≥ un(s
∗
1,s
∗
2, . . . ,s
∗
n−1,sn) for all sn ∈ Sn.
They mean
argmax
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n) = s
∗
i , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1},
and
argmax
sn∈Sn
un(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,sn) = s
∗
n.
We assume that the Nash equilibrium is symmetric in Group 1 that is, it is symmetric for
Players 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Then, s∗i ’s are the same and ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
n)’s are equal for all
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}. Also we have
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn) = u j(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn), j 6= i; i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}.
Since the game is zero-sum,
n−1
∑
i=1
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn)= (n−1)ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn)=−un(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn).
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Thus,
arg min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn) = argmax
sn∈Sn
un(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn) = s
∗
n,
This implies
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,sn) = ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,s
∗
n)
=max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
j , . . . ,s
∗
n).
First we show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric in Group 1, implies
Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of a player in Group 1 and Player n with symmetry in Group
1.
Proof. 1. Let (s∗1,s
∗
2, . . . ,s
∗
n) be a Nash equilibrium of a multi-players zero-sum game. This
means
min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)≤max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n) (5)
= min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,sn)≤max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn).
for Player i, i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}.
On the other hand, since
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)≤ ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn),
we have
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)≤max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn).
This inequality holds for any sn. Thus,
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)≤ min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn).
With (5), we obtain
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn). (6)
(5) and (6) imply
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) =max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n),
min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,sn).
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From
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)≤ ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n),
and
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) =max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n),
we have
argmax
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) = argmax
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,s
∗
n) = s
∗
i ,
for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}. s∗i ’s are equal for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}.
Also, from
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)≥ ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,sn),
and
min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,sn),
we get
arg min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn) = arg min
sn∈Sn
ui(s
∗
1, . . . ,s
∗
i , . . . ,sn) = s
∗
n,
for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}.
Next we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Sion’s minimax theorem with symmetry in Group 1 implies the existence of a
Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in Group 1.
Proof. Let s˜ be a value of s j’s, j 6= i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1} such that
s˜= argmax
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn).
Then, we have
max
si∈Si
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) (7)
= min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn).
Since
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn)≤max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn),
and
min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn),
6
we get
arg min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = arg min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn). (8)
Since the game is zero-sum,
n−1
∑
i=1
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = (n−1)ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) =−un(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn).
Therefore,
arg min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = argmax
sn∈Sn
un(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn).
Let
sˆn = arg min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = argmax
sn∈Sn
un(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn). (9)
Then, from (7) and (8)
min
sn∈Sn
max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) =max
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . , sˆn)
= min
sn∈Sn
ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . ,sn) = ui(s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , s˜, . . . , sˆn).
Thus,
argmax
si∈Si
ui(s˜, . . . ,si, . . . , s˜, . . . , sˆn) = s˜ for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}. (10)
(9) and (10) mean that (s1,s2, . . . ,sn−1,sn) = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜, sˆn) is a Nash equilibrium in which
only Player n may choose a different strategy.
4 Example of relative profit maximizing four-firms
oligopoly
Consider a four-players game. Suppose that the payoff functions of the players are
piA =(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xA− cAxA−
1
3
[(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xB− cBxB
+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xC− cCxC+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xD− cDxD],
piB =(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xB− cBxB−
1
3
[(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xA− cAxA
+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xC− cCxC+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xD− cDxD],
piC =(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xC− cCxC−
1
3
[(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xA− cAxA
+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xB− cBxB+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xD− cDxD],
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piD =(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xD− cDxD−
1
3
[(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xA− cAxA
+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xB− cBxB+(a− xA− xB− xC− xD)xC− cCxC].
This is a model of relative profit maximization in a four firms Cournot oligopoly with constant
marginal costs and zero fixed cost producing a homogeneous good. xi, i = A,B,C,D, are the
outputs of the firms. The conditions for maximization of pii, i= A,B,C,D, are
∂piA
∂xA
= a−2xA− (xB+ xC+ xD)− cA+
1
3
(xB+ xC+ xD) = 0,
∂piB
∂xB
= a−2xB− (xA+ xC+ xD)− cB+
1
3
(xA+ xC+ xD) = 0,
∂piC
∂xC
= a−2xC− (xA+ xB+ xD)− cC+
1
3
(xA+ xB+ xD) = 0,
∂piD
∂xD
= a−2xC− (xA+ xB+ xC)− cD+
1
3
(xA+ xB+ xC) = 0.
The Nash equilibrium strategies are


xA =
2a−5cA+cB+cC+cD
8
,
xB =
2a−5cB+cA+cC+cD
8
,
xC =
2a−5cC+cA+cB+cD
8
,
xD =
2a−5cD+cA+cB+cC
8
.
(11)
Next consider maximin and minimax strategies about Player A and Player D. The condition
for minimization of piA with respect to xD is
∂piA
∂xD
= 0. Denote xD which satisfies this condition
by xD(xA,xB,xC), and substitute it into piA. Then, the condition for maximization of piA with
respect to xA given xD(xA,xB,xC), xB and xC is
∂piA
∂xA
+
∂piA
∂xD
∂xD
∂xA
= 0.
It is denoted by argmaxxAminxD piA. The condition for maximization of piA with respect to xA
is ∂piA
∂xA
= 0. Denote xA which satisfies this condition by xA(xB,xC,xD), and substitute it into piA.
Then, the condition for minimization of piA with respect to xD given xA(xB,xC,xD) is
∂piA
∂xD
+
∂piA
∂xA
∂xA
∂xD
= 0.
It is denoted by argminxDmaxxA piA. In our example we obtain
argmax
xA
min
xD
piA =
2a−3cA+ cD
8
, argmin
xD
max
xA
piA =
6a−3cA−3cD−8xB−8xC
8
.
Similarly, we get the following results.
argmax
xB
min
xD
piB =
2a−3cB+ cD
8
,
8
argmin
xD
max
xB
piB =
6a−3cB−3cD−8xA−8xC
8
,
argmax
xC
min
xD
piC =
2a−3cC+ cD
8
,
argmin
xD
max
xC
piC =
6a−3cC−3cD−8xA−8xB
8
.
If cC = cB = cA,
argmax
xA
min
xD
piA = argmax
xB
min
xD
piB = argmax
xC
min
xD
piC =
2a−3cA+ cD
8
.
These are equal to the Nash equilibrium strategies for Firms A, B and C with cC = cB = cA
and cD 6= cA.
When xA = xB = xC =
2a−3cA+cD
8
, we have
argmin
xD
max
xA
piA = argmin
xD
max
xB
piB = argmin
xD
max
xC
piC =
2a−5cD+3cA
8
.
These are equal to the Nash equilibrium strategy for Firm D with cC = cB = cA.
On the other hand, if cB = cA and cC = cD, we have
argmax
xA
min
xD
piA = argmax
xB
min
xD
piB =
2a−3cA+ cD
8
.
This is not equal to the Nash equilibrium strategies for Firms A and B, with cB = cA and
cC = cD 6= cA which are
xA = xB =
a−2cA+ cD
4
6=
2a−3cA+ cD
8
.
5 Concluding Remark
In this paper we have examined the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous
function and a Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game in which only
one player is different from other players. We have shown that the following two statements
are equivalent.
1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric for players other than one
player, implies Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of this player and one of other players
with symmetry for the other players.
2. Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of one player and one of other players with symmetry
for the other players implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric for
the other players.
As we have shown in Appendix, if there are two aliens, this equivalence does not hold.
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